ABSTRACT
Introduction
The collective model has become increasingly popular for analyzing household consumption behavior. Becker (1973 Becker ( , 1981 …rst considered collective household models, in which the household is characterized as a collection of individuals, each of whom has a well de…ned objective function, and who interact to generate household level decisions. For consumption, the model assumes that expenditures on each good and service the household buys are the outcome of multi-person decision making, in which each individual household member is characterized by his or her own rational preferences. Following Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , 'rational' group consumption is de…ned as any Pareto e¢ cient outcome of a within-group bargaining process. This collective approach contrasts with the conventional unitary approach, which models households as if they were single decision makers.
An intrinsic feature of the collective model is the so-called sharing rule, which governs the within-household distribution of household income. This sharing rule is often interpreted as an indicator of the bargaining power of individual household members. The sharing rule is also useful for recovering information about the economic well being of household members. For example, Lise and Seitz (2011) use sharing rule estimates to recover the population distribution of income across individuals rather than across households, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2006) combine the sharing rule with other information to recover "indi¤erence scales" that measure the welfare implications of changes in household composition, and Dunbar, Lewbel, and Pendakur (2012) use sharing rule estimates to back out rates of child poverty. See, also Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005) , Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) , Bargain and Donni (2012) , and Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2012a) for various applications of the collective consumption model that make use of the sharing rule concept.
In empirical analyses, the sharing rule is generally not observed. Typically, the only information available is total household expenditures on each good or service the household buys, along with general household characteristics like demographic composition, and information on wages, income, holdings of durables, and wealth measures. Distribution factors are observed household characteristics that a¤ect Pareto weights in a household's model but not the preferences of individual household members. A well known result in this literature is that changes in the sharing rule resulting from changes in distribution factors can be identi…ed given household level demand functions, but the levels of the sharing rules are not themselves identi…ed. See, e.g., Chiappori and Ekeland (2009) for the most general statement and proof of this result.
This nonidenti…cation is unfortunate, because many of the uses of sharing rule estimates, such as calculation of poverty lines, indi¤erence scales, and distributions of income and welfare, all depend on the level of the sharing rules. A few di¤erent responses to this nonidenti…cation result have been proposed. The commonest response is to ignore the problem, and only report estimates of the impact of distribution factors on sharing rules. A second approach is to try to collect more information on the consumption of individual household members (see, e.g., Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2012a), though this method is inherently limited by the di¢ culty of measuring the fraction of shared goods that are consumed by each individual. A third response is to make additional identifying assumptions. These assumptions take the form of assuming some features of individuals'preferences remain the same across households of di¤erent compositions (…rst proposed in Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 2006) .
In this paper, we return to the standard Chiappori framework, where all that can be observed is household level demand functions, and no additional assumptions are made. We show that although sharing rules cannot be point identi…ed, the household's demand functions do provide information regarding sharing, and that information can be used to calculate informative bounds on the sharing rules. In short, we show that sharing rules can be usefully set identi…ed, even though they are not in general point identi…ed.
We propose a practical method for calculating upper and lower bounds on the resource shares of each individual in a household, consistent with the collective consumption model. The method allows for the presence of both public and private goods within the household, and does not require the public or private nature of any good to be speci…ed a priori. However, if a subset of goods is known to be private, then we can use that information to tighten the bounds.
Essentially, our method …rst adopts a revealed preference approach in the tradition of Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950) to characterize the collective model of household consumption. Sharing rule bounds are obtained by combining the information given by a household's demand function with the restrictions implied by having the unobserved demand functions of individual household members satisfy revealed preference theory, and add up to the household's demand functions. In empirical practice, we apply our revealed preference based restrictions to household demand functions that are estimated using nonparametric regression methods, thereby combining standard household demand estimation techniques with less standard revealed preference restrictions that apply to the collective consumption model. Another paper that combines estimated demand functions with revealed preference restrictions is Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008) . They assume a unitary rather than collective model of consumption behavior and apply revealed preference restrictions to nonparametrically estimated Engel curves to obtain bounds on demand functions that are consistent with the unitary model. In their case, demands as functions of total expenditures are estimated separately in each of a limited number of price regimes, and revealed preference restrictions (assuming the household behaves as a single utility maximizing consumer) are then imposed to bound demands as functions of prices. In contrast, we nonparametrically estimate household demands as functions of both total expenditures and prices, and then impose revealed preference restrictions at the level of individual household members to obtain bounds on the sharing rule. Their use of estimated Engel curves yields tighter bounds than only applying revealed preference restrictions to observed data points. Similarly, our use of estimated demand functions provides more information than applying collective model revealed preference restrictions just to observed data points.
Many papers propose tests or checks of whether household demands are consistent with the Chiappori model of rational, Pareto e¢ cient group consumption, without actually identifying the sharing rule. Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide a differential characterization of the general collective consumption model. 1 They …nd that household behavior is consistent with this model only if there exists a household pseudo-Slutsky matrix that can be decomposed as the sum of a symmetric negative semi-de…nite matrix and a matrix of rank 1 (in the case of two household members). Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) show that this condition, together with homogeneity and adding up, is also (locally) su¢ cient for the existence of individual utility functions and Pareto weights that reproduce the observed household behavior. Working with discrete sets of price and quantity bundles re ‡ecting households'expenditure choices, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2007, 2010, 2011) derive revealed preference characterizations of the general version of the collective model that we consider here, in the Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) , and Varian (1982) tradition. In particular, Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2011) show how information regarding the sharing rule can be recovered using this pure revealed preference characterization, but only with discrete sets of price and quantity bundles. In contrast, the present paper exploits the greater information that is available in continuous demand functions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general collective consumption model and the corresponding sharing rule representation. Section 3 discusses revealed preference restrictions. Section 4 considers sharing rule identi…cation. Section 5 introduces extensions to settings where the private consumption of some goods is assignable to individual household members. Section 6 presents an empirical application that demonstrates the practical usefulness of our identi…cation method for various purposes. Section 7 concludes.
The collective model and the sharing rule
This section formally presents the collective model, and introduces the sharing rule representation that will be used in the following sections.
A general collective model
We consider a household with two individuals (1 and 2) who consume a set of goods N = f1; :::; jN jg. 2 We assume a household demand function g that de…nes a quantity bundle q 2R 
for U c . Thus, under these prices the maximization program (2) corresponds to the second step of the two-step procedure described above (for given y 1 and y 2 de…ned in the …rst step).
The sharing rule is the crucial concept underlying the characterization in (2) . In the literature on the collective consumption model, this sharing rule is often interpreted as an indicator for the bargaining power of the individual group members: a higher relative income share of member m (y m =y) is then regarded as an indication of increased bargaining power for that member. 4 The sharing rule concept is particularly useful in applications, because it is independent of cardinal representations of preferences (in contrast to the bargaining weight ).
Revealed preferences
From an empirical point of view, we typically only observe the household demand function g and income y and not the individual demand functions g m or income shares y m (m = 1; 2). Our primary goal is then to identify the sharing rule that de…nes the individual incomes y 1 and y 2 given this observed data. In Section 4, we will introduce our method of identifying bounds on the sharing rule, starting from a revealed preference characterization of the above de…ned collective consumption model. We provide this revealed preference characterization in the current section. 
Basic concepts
We can now de…ne the following concept. is asymmetric.
Our sharing rule identi…cation method will exploit the empirical implications of WARP in the context of the collective household consumption model. At this point, it is worth indicating that Houthakker (1950) actually presented a strengthened version of WARP, i.e. the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP). Essentially, SARP extends WARP by also exploiting transitivity of preferences. By construction, a demand function satis…es SARP only if it satis…es WARP. In view of our following discussion, an interesting question is whether the converse is also true, i.e. a demand function satis…es SARP if it satis…es WARP. It can be veri…ed that this does not hold in general (see Gale, 1960 , and Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein, 1976). However, Uzawa (1960 Uzawa ( , 1971 ) derived minimal regularity conditions for the function g m that make the WARP condition equivalent to the SARP condition. See also Bossert (1993) for discussion.
In conclusion, our focus on WARP means that we do not consider implications of transitive preferences captured by SARP. Our motivation is that it is di¢ cult to operationalize transitivity when implementing the procedure that we outline in Sections 4 and 5. The implication is that we do not fully exploit all the information that could be used and that, in principle, even tighter bounds might be obtained when transitivity can be accounted for. However, the loss of information is zero for individual demand functions g m that satisfy Uzawa's regularity conditions mentioned above.
Characterizing the collective model
So far, we have used individual demand functions g m , which are typically not known in empirical analysis (i.e. we only know the household demand function g). Therefore, to develop an approach for sharing rule identi…cation that can be used in practice, we consider the concept of 'admissible'individual demand functions. Essentially, this concept captures all possible speci…cations of the (unknown) individual demand functions that are consistent with the (known) household demand function. More formally, we use the following de…nition.
De…nition 3 (admissible individual demands) Let g be a household demand function. For this function g, the individual demand functions g 1 and g 2 are admissible individual demand functions if, for all p and y,
for some p m;c (m = 1; 2; c = 1; 2; H) and y m such that
Next, Q (g) represents the collection of all admissible individual demands g 1 and g 2 , i.e.
and g 2 are admissible individual demand functionsg:
We can now de…ne the condition for a collective rationalization that we will use. Basically, this condition states that (for the given function g) there must exist at least one speci…cation of admissible individual demand functions that solves (2). De…nition 4 (collective rationalization) Let g be a household demand function. A pair of utility functions U 1 and U 2 provides a collective rationalization of g if there exist admissible individual demand functions (
We have the following result, which establishes a revealed preference characterization of the collective consumption model under consideration. (Appendix 1 contains the proofs of our main results.) Proposition 1 Consider a household demand function g. There exists a pair of utility functions U 1 and U 2 that provides a collective rationalization of g only if there exist admissible individual demand functions (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g) that both satisfy WARP.
In the next section, we will show that this WARP condition provides a useful starting point to develop a practical method for sharing rule identi…cation.
Sharing rule identi…cation
Consider a household demand function g. We focus on identifying the sharing rule for prices p E and household income y E , for which we observe g (p E ; y E ). The (set) identi…cation question asks for bounds on the individual incomes (y 1 E and y 2 E ) that are consistent with a collective rationalization of the observed household demand g. Our procedure will start from the characterization given in Proposition 1. Essentially, it de…nes lower bounds y l1 E and y l2 E and upper bounds y u1 E and y u2 E so that
These bounds will be independent of the speci…cation of the admissible individual demand functions.
Identi…cation in theory
To sketch the basic idea of our approach, we …rst suppose the individual demand functions g 1 and g 2 are given (in addition to the household demand g). We remark that in this case we would also know the individual prices p m;c (m = 1; 2; c = 1; 2; H) and income y m that imply g (p; y) = g m (p m;1 ; p m;2 ; p m;c ; y m ) for each p and y. See De…nition 3.
E ; y E ). Then, g 1 and g 2 are consistent with a collective rationalization of g only if
This necessary condition for a collective rationalization of g directly follows from the WARP conditions in Proposition 1. The right hand sides of the inequalities in (5) 
The max operator in the objective makes that the upper bounds y u1 E and y u2 E apply to any possible speci…cation of (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g). Corresponding lower bounds are de…ned as y l1 E = y E y u2 E and y l2 E = y E y u1 E . It directly follows that a collective rationalization of the data is possible only for individual income shares y 1 E and y 2 E that meet (4) . One …nal remark is in order. It follows from our discussion preceding program P.0 that, if the solution value of program P.0 does not exceed y E , it is impossible to specify income shares y 1 E and y 2 E that meet (4). The interpretation is that, in such a case, the demand function g cannot be collectively rationalized. Or, in other words, we conclude that the collective model is rejected for the function g at hand. Analogous results apply to the programs that we present below, which will be relevant for our application in Section 6.
Identi…cation in practice
The above program P.0 is not directly useful in practice, because it requires considering in…nitely many combinations of the individual demands (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g). In this section, we present a program that has practical usefulness, because it allows for sharing rule identi…cation by solely using information on the household demand g.
A starting result characterizes the bundles x 1 and x 2 that satisfy
o q E in program P.0 in terms of the household demand function g.
Proposition 2
Thus, as soon as condition C holds, we conclude that
The explanation is as follows. Like in program P.0, the objective minimizes the sum (y u1 E + y u2 E ) by suitable selecting x 1 and x 2 (de…ned by p 1 , p 2 , y 1 and y 2 ; see (P.1-3)): a lower objective function value corresponds to tighter sharing rule bounds. Next, because of Proposition 2, the constraint (P.1-2) implies
Without loss of generality, we assume 1-1) . This parallels the fact that we do not consider a particular speci…cation of the individual functions g m in the program P.1. Importantly, the objective as well as most constraints in program P.1 are linear. The only nonlinear constraint is (P.
In Appendix 2, we present a stylized example that demonstrates the mechanics of program P.1. Interestingly, this example shows that the method discussed in this section can obtain arbitrarily tight bounds on the individual incomes for the general version of the collective model, even if no good is speci…ed as public or private a priori. This is a noteworthy result, as it stands in sharp contrast with the …nding of Chiappori and Ekeland (2009), who conclude that the di¤erential approach does not allow for such sharing rule identi…cation (see our discussion in the introductory section).
We conclude from the example in Appendix 2 that, in principle, the method described here may work well for sharing rule identi…cation. In practice, however, additional information on the private nature of goods may help to strengthen the analysis. For example, this will be the case for the empirical application that we present in Section 6. In the next section, we show how to extend our method to include such information on private goods.
Extensions
In empirical applications, it is often reasonable to assume that a subset of goods is privately consumed without externalities, while the nature of the other goods is unknown. In fact, applications of the collective consumption model usually include assignability of particular goods to individual household members. Such goods are then called exclusive goods, because they exclusively bene…t the utility of single household members; see Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009) . This section considers including such information on privately consumed goods in our method for sharing rule identi…-cation. First, we will reformulate program P.1 to account for goods that are privately consumed without externalities. Subsequently, we will consider assignability of such goods to individual members. 
Private goods without externalities
Intuitively, because there are no consumption externalities for good n, the willingness to pay of household member m for member l's consumption is zero.
5
Using (7), we can reformulate program P.1 as follows:
s.t.
Similar to before, the constraint (P.2-3) implies
o q E : Thus, we again get the condition (6) . In this case, we have
Therefore, we can use
which obtains (P.2-1) and (P.2-2) instead of (P.1-1) before. We note that for n 2 N A the privately consumed quantities (x 1 k ) n and (x 2 k ) n are not given a priori and therefore de…ned within program P.2 (subject to the constraint (P.2-4)). Like before, program P.2 is solved by nonlinear programming techniques.
Exclusive goods
So far, we have abstracted from assignability of the goods n 2 N A to individual household members. To account for such assignability, let N Am N A represent the set of goods that are assignable (or exclusive) to member m. Then, we get
Using this, we obtain the following extension of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Let g be a household demand function. Then, we have
o q E for all admissible individual demand functions (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g) that satisfy WARP if x 1 = g (p 1 ; y 1 ) and x 2 = g (p 2 ; y 2 ) such that one of the following conditions holds:
It is interesting to compare this result to the one in Proposition 2. The essential di¤erence is that, in contrast to condition C, the new conditions C.1, C.2 and C.3 'assign' preference relations to individual household members (i.e. we get
o q E ). This assigning of preference relations is possible because we can use information on assignable goods.
Because of Proposition 3, we must consider three nonlinear programs (in addition to program P.2) to de…ne y u1 E , y u2 E , y l1 E , y l2 E . Each program has the same structure as P.2, except that the condition C (in the constraint (P.2-3)) is replaced by one of the conditions C.1-C.3. 'Best' upper (resp. lower) bounds then correspond to minimum (resp. maximum) values de…ned over the di¤erent programs.
Application
We apply our methods to a labor supply setting. Speci…cally, at observed individual wage rates we consider the allocation of a household's full income (the sum of both spouses' maximum possible labor income and the household's non-labor income) to both spouses'leisure and consumption. Household consumption is here treated as an aggregate Hicksian commodity with price normalized at unity. This setting contains substantial price (i.e. wage) variation, which is useful for obtaining informative sharing rule bounds. Also, this application allows us to consider various assumptions regarding the nature of the di¤erent goods. For example, we can see how much the bounds tighten if we treat each individual's leisure as an exclusive private good, or if we treat the aggregate Hicksian commodity as a private good without externalities. Lise and Seitz (2011) similarly use labor supply to identify resource shares, but for identi…cation their results depend on strong functional form assumptions, as well as restrictions across households like those in Browning, Chiappori, and Lewbel (2006) . Some implementations of collective household models treat wages as distribution factors, thereby assuming they only a¤ect sharing rules and not preferences. In our application, wages are prices (of leisure). Our methodology provides sharing rule bounds without requiring the presence of any distribution factors.
Set-up
We apply our sharing rule identi…cation method to a sample of Dutch households drawn from the 2009 wave of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel that is gathered by CentERdata. This survey, which is representative for the Dutch population, contains a rich variety of economic and socio-demographic variables. 6 The set of households used for this study was subject to the following sample selection rules. First we selected couples where both adult members participate in the labor market. We include both couples with and without children. 7 Next, we excluded the self-employed to avoid issues regarding imputation of wages and the separation of consumption from work related expenditures. After deleting the households with important missing information (mostly, incomplete information on one of the spouses), we obtained a sample of 211 observations. This sample is rather small for our purposes, but as we show below, it still contains enough information to yield meaningful results. Table 1 provides summary statistics on the relevant price and quantity data for the sample at hand. Wages are net hourly wages. Leisure is measured in hours per week. To compute leisure hours we assume an individual needs 10 hours per day for sleeping and eating (i.e. leisure = 168 -70 -hours worked). Full income and consumption are measured in euros per week. For completeness, Table 1 (last column) also reports on the number of children in the households under consideration. us to obtain reasonably tight bounds despite our relatively small sample size. A crucial ingredient to our identi…cation method is the household's vector-valued demand function with respect to both spouses'leisure and total household consumption (i.e. the function g in the earlier sections), which we need to estimate. To avoid speci…cation errors, we use our sample to estimate this function nonparametrically. Speci…cally, we de…ne the …rst two elements of g to be the …tted values of nonparametrically regressing both spouses'leisure on their wage rates and on the household's full income, using a Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator with a multivariate Gaussian kernel. The remaining element of g, the household's consumption demand function, is then obtained by the adding-up restriction. Our entire model, including the nonparametric regression step, was coded in MATLAB, using the TOMLAB/SNOPT code to solve our nonlinear programs.
We …rst experimented with three di¤erent general model speci…cations. The …rst was the most general speci…cation of the collective model, which makes no prior assumption regarding the public or private nature of any good, thereby allowing any of our three goods (i.e. the aggregate Hicksian commodity and both spouses'leisure) to be private (with or without externalities), public, or both. We found that this speci…-cation did not provide useful bounds on income shares. Since we know from our theory that this most general model can yield informative bounds, our empirical results with this speci…cation are likely due to the limited size of our available data set.
At the other extreme, we also considered the model speci…cation in which all three goods are assumed to be privately consumed without externalities, and that male and female leisure are exclusive (assignable), and so do not generate externalities within the household. Essentially, this corresponds to the original 'egoistic'labor supply model of Chiappori (1988) . Here, we found that this collective model is systematically rejected, implying that a purely egoistic model cannot rationalize our data. 8 Given the above results, we did all of our remaining analyses assuming an inbetween speci…cation where male and female leisure are assumed to be private and assignable, generating no externalities, while no restriction is placed on the nature of the Hicksian aggregate commodity. This allows consumption to be private (with or without externalities), public, or both.
Empirical results

RP based sharing rule bounds versus atheoretic bounds
As a …rst exercise, we compare the bounds on female income shares (male shares are one minus the female shares) that are obtained by our revealed preference (RP) methodology with 'atheoretic' bounds. These atheoretic bounds do not make use of the (theoretical) RP restrictions associated with the collective consumption model and are de…ned as follows: the lower bound for a female in a particular household equals the share of the value of her leisure in this household's full income; the corresponding upper bound adds the share of household consumption in the household's full income to this lower bound. In other words, the atheoretic lower (upper) bound corresponds to an (extreme) scenario where all the household's consumption is allocated to the male (female).
The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 2 . The table shows that our RP based bounds provide a substantial gain in precision compared to the atheoretic bounds. The average di¤erence between the upper and lower atheoretic bounds is about 36 percentage points, while this di¤erence equals only about 11.5 percentage points for the RP based bounds. The median di¤erence between the upper and lower RP based bounds is about 5 percentage points, whereas this di¤erence is substantially larger (i.e. about 36 percentage points) for the atheoretic bounds. Qualitatively similar results are obtained for the other quantiles reported in the We next focus on the relation between our RP based bounds and some observed individual and household characteristics. Figure 1 shows the relation between the absolute RP based bounds on the female income share and the logarithm of the household's full income. Each X and + sign on the …gure represents the upper and lower bound for a given household in our sample. To better visualize our results, we included trendlines showing local sample averages of the estimated upper and lower bounds. Figure 1 shows that the average bounds are fairly tight, re ‡ecting the results in Table 2. The trendlines are upward sloping, showing that female income share is a normal good (as opposed to an inferior good) for the household. They are also roughly 45 degrees, showing that the female's share of household income is not far from proportional to total household income. Figure 2 con…rms the rough proportionality of female income to total household income, by plotting the relative share of the female (her income share as a fraction of full income) against the household's full income. The trendlines give an average upper bound hovering around 60% and average lower bound around 40%. This …nding lends empirical support to the assumption that relative income shares do not vary with the logarithm of total income, which Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and Bargain and Donni (2012) used to help point identify resource shares.
10 Figure 2 further suggests that the income shares of females and males are not far from equal on average. This is con…rmed by the average lower and upper bound for all the households in the sample, which equal 10 Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2012) used a weaker version of the same assumption, by requiring it to hold (only) at a range of low income levels. Here, we must also add that these authors de…ne publicness of goods di¤erently than we do. Next, their empirical applications focus on a di¤erent de…nition of full income, since they do not include leisure in their consumption models. See also Menon, Pendakur, and Perali (2012) for some direct estimates of intrahousehold resource shares. 43.2% and 54.7%, respectively. However, the …gure also shows that some households divide income very unequally, e.g., one household has upper and lower bounds of the relative female income share equal to 22.1% and 25.6%, while in another household these bounds are 76.3% and 83.1%. 11 We next look at the relationship between the bounds on the relative female income share and the relative wage (de…ned as female wage divided by male wage). Figure 3 shows the household speci…c upper and lower bounds and the corresponding trendlines. In line with our prior expectations, both bounds clearly increase when the relative wage of females goes up. This result, which we obtained through our robust RP based approach, con…rms earlier evidence found in the literature, which shows that a household member's bargaining power generally increases with her/his wage (see Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002, Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac and Meghir, 2007 , and Ore¢ ce, 2011, among many others).
Poverty analysis
A unique advantage of models that focus on the intrahousehold allocation of resources is that they allow one to conduct welfare analyses at the level of individuals rather In what follows, we conduct a poverty analysis at the level of individuals by means of our RP based bounds. Unlike previous studies that are based on point identi…ed sharing rules, we do not require any assumptions regarding similarity of preferences across individuals or on functional forms for our analysis. 12 Our analysis is based entirely on the separate observed choice behavior of each couple, without any assumption regarding the functional form of preferences or the sharing rule. Table 3 summarizes the results of our poverty analysis. The …rst column contains the poverty rate among unitary households. This poverty rate is calculated in the usual way: it is the percentage of households of which the full income falls below the poverty line, which we de…ne as 60% of the median full income in our sample of households. Note that while 60% of median income is a standard measure of relative poverty, in our case the poverty rate is calculated on the basis of full income instead of (the more commonly considered) earnings or total expenditures. Also, we restrict attention to couples where both spouses participate to the labor market. Such households should be less subject to poverty than households containing an unemployed, retired or disabled spouse.
The second column of Table 3 shows the incidence of poverty at the level of individuals in our sample. Here our RP based income shares come into play. Similar to before, an individual is labelled as poor if her/his income share falls below the corresponding individual poverty line. The results in Table 3 use half the households'poverty line as the individual poverty line. Based on our income share bounds calculations, we can compute upper and lower bounds for the individual poverty rates. If all couples split income perfectly equally, then these poverty rates would equal those of column 1. However, despite our earlier …nding that many couples appear to have close to equal splits, we obtain lower and upper poverty rate bounds of 8.53% and 21.33%, respectively, compared to the unitary household rate of 4.27%.
These bounds indicate that, due to unequal sharing of resources within households, the fraction of individuals living below the poverty line is two to …ve times greater than those obtained by standard measures that ignore intrahousehold allocations. When we focus on females and males separately, we see that the lower bound on the poverty rate is a bit lower for males than for females, showing that households tend to devote somewhat more resources towards males. Based on our previous …gures, this di¤erence is not surprisingly related to males tending to have higher wages. 
Households All individuals Females Males
Conclusion
It has long been known that, under the standard Pareto e¢ cient collective household model, the income sharing rule is not identi…ed. Past responses to this result have been to focus on features of the model that are identi…ed (like the impacts of distribution factors), or to add additional strong identifying assumptions on preferences and behavior. In contrast, we …rst show at a theoretical level that, given just household level demand functions, bounds on the sharing rule can be obtained. Moreover, informative bounds are possible even when nothing is known about the privateness or assignability of the goods being consumed by household members, and when no distribution factors are observed. We also show how these bounds can be implemented using standard programming methods, with household level demand functions that are estimated by standard nonparametric regression methods.
At the practical level, we demonstrate that our identi…cation methods are empirically tractable, yielding meaningfully narrow bounds when applied to a small data set of Dutch households. These bounds enable analyses of the e¤ects of household characteristics like income and relative wages on income shares, and a distributional analysis of the incidence of poverty at the level of individuals rather than at the level of observed households.
In our analyses, the household demand function needed to be estimated, and we have not explicitly taken estimation errors in these functions into account. In our empirical application the sample size (both in number of households and number of observations per household) is relatively small, which would in any case limit the applicability of asymptotic distribution theory. Still, in principle it might be possible to base inference on set identi…cation methods like Manski (2003) For simplicity, our analysis was based on households with two members, implicitly treating expenditures on children as consumption yielding utility for the parents. However, our methods immediately extend to handle more than two consumers per household, and therefore could (given a larger sample) be used to estimate bounds on children's resource shares as well, treating children as additional consumers with their own utility functions and Pareto weights in the collective model. 
Proof of Proposition 2
As a …rst step, we prove (for all (g
To obtain this result, we note that y 1 p for m = 1 or 2, which can also be expressed as
Now, without loss of generality, let us assume As a second step, we show (for all (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g))
To prove this result, we …rst observe that y 2 p 
Combining (8), (11) and (13) 
Proof of Proposition 3
In what follows, we only give the proof for condition C.1. The arguments for the remaining conditions C.2 and C.3 are readily analogous.
As a …rst step, we prove that (for x = x 1 ; q E and for all (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g)) X
) x 2 R o q E for all (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g) : This proves (14) .
From this …rst step we conclude x 2 R g 2 o x 1 under condition C.1. Next,we can use a similar argument as in Proposition 2 (for (11) ) to obtain (for all (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g))
This gives the wanted result: we have x 1 R g 1 o q E and x 2 R g 2 o q E for all admissible individual demand functions (g 1 ; g 2 ) 2 Q (g) that satisfy WARP if condition C.1 holds.
recall that in practice the empirical analyst does not observe this consumption model, and so our identi…cation method can only use the household demand that results from it (see further). Speci…cally, consider a household with individual utility functions (for (q) n the consumed quantity of the nth entry good) U 1 = ( A) (q) 1 + (B ( 1)A) (q) 2 + C (q) 3 and (18) U 2 = (B ( 1)A) (q) 1 + A (q) 2 + C (q) 3 ,
where , A, B and C are positive real numbers speci…ed below. Non-negative consumption externalities require (B ( 1)A) to be positive. Intuitively, referring to our labor supply application in Section 6 of the main text, one may think of goods 1 and 2 as leisure of, respectively, the …rst and the second household member, while good 3 represents (other) household consumption.
Next, we assume the following Pareto weight speci…cation:
Essentially, this complies with a bargaining weight that is extremely sensitive to the ratio of the price of good 2 to the price of good 1. In a labor supply setting, the ratio (p) 2 =(p) 1 represents the relative wages within the household. Then, if wages are di¤erent, the member with the higher wage gets full bargaining power, while both members have exactly the same bargaining weight if spouses'wages are equal.
In what follows, we consider 0 < < 1. For given , we specify , A, B and C such that A C > 2 + 2 and C A + B > 1 1 + Then, for (B ( 1)A) positive but su¢ ciently small, it is easily veri…ed that the model speci…cation in (18) and (20) generates exactly the demand function g used in our following argument. Now, consider p E = (0:5 + =2; 0:5 + =2; 1) and y E = 1.
Our collective model implies
q E = g (p E ; y E ) = (0; 0; 1) :
Next, program P.1 obtains p 1 = (1 + ; 1; =2) and y 1 = 1 + , p 2 = (1; 1 + ; =2) and y 1 = 1 + , rations, which considerably facilitates our following argument. At this point, it is worth to emphasize that we use these zero quantities only for mathematical elegance and this does not a¤ect the core of our argument. These upper and lower bounds will become arbitrarily tight (i.e. precise recovery) if gets arbitrarily small. In words, in observation E the household members 1 and 2 will apply (approximately) equal income sharing under collectively rational behavior.
